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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of the Application of
EDDIE WILLIAMS, #85-A-1408,

COUNTY OF ALBANY

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Petitioner,

For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules,

Index No. 446-15

-againstNEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION,
Respondent.
(Supreme Court, Albany County)
APPEARANCES:

Eddie Williams, 85-A-1408
Petitioner, Pro-Se
Otisville Correctional Facili~y
P.O. Box 8
57 Sanitarium Road
Otisville, New York 10963-0008
Eric T. Schneiderman
Attorney General of the State of New York
Attorney for Respondent
Melissa Latino, Esq., of counsel
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224-0341

Connolly, J.:

Tn this CPLR article 78 proceeding, petitioner seeks review of the March 26, 2014
determination by the Board of Parole denying his application for discretionary parole release.
Respondent opposes the petition.
Petitioner appealed the Board's determination, however a d~termination on such appeal was
not rendered within four months ofhis submission. As a result ofthe appeals unit's failure to decide
the administrative appeal within four months, petitioner is entitled to treat his administrative remedy
as exhausted and seek judicial review of the underlying determination (see Matter ofLord v. State

Executive Department Board/Divisi6n of Parole, 263 AD2d 945 [4th Dept 1999]; People ex rel.
Tyler v. Travis, 269 AD2d 636 [3d Dept 2000]; 9 NYCRR § 8006.4[c]).
At the March 26, 2014 parole hearing, the.Board determined:
DENIED - Hold for 24 months, Next appearance Date: 03/2016
After carefully reviewing your record, a personal interview & considering
statutory requirements, after due deliberation, this pariel concludes that
discretionary release is denied. You stand convicted of the serious offenses
of Murder znd and Burglary 1st involving your actions causing the death of a
wheelchair bound woman. Her cause of death was strangulation and she had been
beaten. This brutal crime of a disabled individual deprived a woman, loved by her
family, of her life. The panel makes note of your program goals and
accomplishments, risks and needs assessment, your clean discipline record and
. community opposition to your release. Aiso, your record including your release
plans, your entire packet entitled "Redemption Record", and sentencing minutes have
been reviewed and considered. Discretionary release shall not be granted merely
because of good conduct or program completion while confined, but after
consideration of the specific factors enumerated in the law. After re-yiewing your
overall record and statutory factors, discretionary release is not presently warranted
as there is a reasonable probability you would not live at liberty without again
violating the law and furthermore, your release would be incompatible with the
welfare of society and would so deprecate the serious nature of the crime as to
undermine respect for the law.

The Board's actions are judicial in nature and may not be reviewed if done in accordance
with the law. Decis.ions regarding release on parole are discretionary and will not be disturbed ifthey
satisfy the statutory requirements (Executive Law§ 259-i; Matter ofWalker v. New York Sta(e Div.

ofParole, 203 AD2d 757 [3d Dept 1994]) and there is no showing of"irrationality bordering on
impropriety" (Matter ofRusso v. New York State Bd. ofParole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [1980); Matter of

.,

Silmon v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000]; Matter ofSaunders v. Travis, 238 AD2d 688 [3d Dept
1997]; Matter ofFelder v. Travis, 278 AD2d 570 [3d Dept 2000]).
Petitioner advances the following arguments in this proceeding, incorporating the arguments
made in his appeal: 1) that the Board of Parole ("Board") inappropriately based its decision solely
on the nature ofthe instant offense; 2) that the Board applied Executive Law 259-c(4) to petitioner's
2

needs in ·the community and not as a measure of rehabilitation; and 3) the use of community
opposition after five prior parole denials is arbitrarY and capricious.
The Parole Board is 'not required to articulate every factor considered or give equal
weight to each [statutory] factor" (Matter ofRodriguez v Board ofParole, 100 AD3d 1179, 1180
(3d Dept 2012]; see Matter of Vaughn v Evans, 98 AD3d 1158, 1160 [3d J:?ept 2012]; Matter of

Maricevic v Evans, 86 AD3d 879, 880 [3d Dept 2011]). As outlined above and as evident in the
record before it, the Board did consider the relevant factors. For instance, in addition to the
serious nature of the underlying crime, the Board considered petitioner's disdplimµy record and
programming, institutional achievements, sentencing minutes, proposed release plans and
COMPAS Re-entry Risk Assessment (see Matter ofMaricevic, 86 AD3d at 880; Matter ofMotti

v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1114, 1115 [3d Dept 2008]). The seriousness of the offense is still a valid
factor for consideration, and the board properly inquired into that (see, Executive Law §
259-i(l)(a) and (2)(c); Matter of Rios v. New York State Div. ofParole, 24 AD3d 1147 [3d Dept
2005]): If the .Board afforded greater weight to petitioner's criminal behavior, that does not
render the denial of parole ir;ational or improper. (see Hamilton v New York State Div. ·Of

Parole, 2014 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS S417 [3d Dept July 24, 2014]; Matter ofAnthony v. New
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York State Div. ofParole, 17 AD3d. 301 [1 st Dept 2005], Iv denied 5 NY3d 708 [2005]). In
addition, the Board's decision was sufficiently detailed to apprise petitioner of the reaso~s for his
denial of parole release (Matter ofDavis v. Travis, 292 AD2d 742 [3rd Dept 2002]; Matter of

Whitehead v. Russi, 201AD2d.825 [3rd Dept 1994]). The Board i~ not required to enumerate or
give equal weight to each factor it considered (see, Matter ofMacKenzie v Evans, 95 AD3d 1613
[3d Dept 2012]; Matter ofSerrano v Alexander, 70 AD3d 1099 (3d Dept 2010]) nor must the
Board recite the precise statutory language of the first sentence of Executive Law 259-i(2)(c)(A)
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(see Matter ofSilvero v Denniso'n, 28 AD3d 859 (3d Dept 2006]). The Board is vested with
'discretion to determine whether release was appropriate, notwithstanding the minimum period of
incarceration set by the sentencing Court. (Cody v. Dennison, 33 AD3d 1141 [3d Dept 2006], lv.
denied, 8 NY3d 802 [2007]). Further, as stated above, the record indicates that the Board used
the "COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment" instrument (see Matter ofLashway v Evans, 110
AD2d 1417, 1418 [3d Dept 2013]), "which is a document created and intended to bring the
Board into compliance with recent amendments to Executive Law§ 259-c (4)" (Matter of·

Linares v Evans,112 AD3d 1056 [3d Dept 2013]). Petitioner argues that during the hearing one
of the Commissioners noted that the COMPAS was used to "see what your needs might be in the
community", and, accordingly, "applied the COMPAS exclusively as a tool to see what
petitioner's needs might be in the community" (Petition, ~27).

Su~h

contention is without merit.

Initially, petitioner has failed to note that the transcript demonstrates that Commissioner
Alexander stated in such quoted sentence that the COMPAS is used ."to see what your needs and

risks might be in the community." Further, the Commissioner discussed the risk findings of the
COMPAS. Based upon the record, petitioner bas failed to dempnstrate that the Board
inappropriately utilized the COMPAS nor that it "exclusively used it as a tool to see that
petitioner's needs might be in the community".
Finally, petitioner contends that th~ use of communify opposition is improper, however,
pursuant to Executive Law §259-i, the Board must consider whether the release of a petitioner is
'

compatible with the safety and welfare of the community and the J:loard may consider
communications from individuals for or against an individuals release to parole (see 9 NYCRR
§8000.5(c)(2). In this case, however, respondent has failed to demonstrate to the Court what
community opposition, if any, was relied upon by the Board in making its determination. The
4

Court is unable to determine from the record what community opposition was considered. As
such "community opposition" was specifically mentioned by the Board and the record fails to
contain any evidence that such opposition exists, and as it is not for this Court to determine the
extent of the weight the Board gave to such unidentified and unproduced opposition, but rather
for the Parole Board to make ~uch determination, the matter must be remitted for a de novo
parole hearing.
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the petitioner
were submitted to th0 Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, is sealing all
records submitted for in camera review.
Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the petition is granted solely to the extent that the

Board's March 26, 2014 determination denying petitioner parole rel~ase is annulled and the matter
is remitted to the Board of Parole for re-hearing.
This Memorandum constitutes the Decision and Judgment of the Court. This original
Decision and Judgment is being returned to the attorney for respondent. A copy oft4e Decision and
Judgnient, along with the underlying papers, are being forwarded to the County Clerk for filing. The
signing of this Decision and Order shall not constitute entry or filing under CPLR 2220.
Counsel is not relieved from the provision of that rule regarding filing, entry, or notice of
entry.
SO ORDERED.
ENTER.

i._,

Dated: May
2015
Albany, New York
Gerald W. Coruiolly ·r
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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Papers Considered:
I.
Order to Show Cause dated February 9, 2015; Petition dated January 21, 2015
with accompanying exhibits;
. 2.
Answer dated April 20, 2015 wit~ accompanying exhibits A-I; Affirmation ofT.
Tracy dated April 17, 2015 with accompanying exhibits A-F; Memorandum of
Law in Support of Respondent's Answer;
·
3.
Reply dated April 23, 2015.

.,
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